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1. The ruses of ideology
The terms ‘materialism’ and ‘materiality’ are subject to a bewildering variety of uses in contemporary theory. Many of these uses serve not to define a particular field of research, or a definite method, but to orient and demarcate; they often repeat, in attenuated guise, that polemical impetus (against religion, idealism, spirit, transcendence and abstraction, or even nobility and good taste) which has led many an anti-systemic thinker to emblazon ‘materialism’ on their banner.​[1]​ Yet even as the explicit echoes of philosophical combats – trespassing into cultural and political ones – fade, there is still a certain aura, in the field of theory, which attaches to the declaration, be it in thought or discourse, of the primacy of matter. 
	In what follows, I wish to consider some of the ways in which this polemical affirmation of matter’s anteriority to thought has been unsettled by theorists grappling with the stakes of the intellectual tradition that for many became, across the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, the only truly contemporary materialism: Marxism. My title is borrowed in part from an illuminating provocation in Balibar's The Philosophy of Marx, which tells us that 'Marx's materialism has nothing to do with a reference to matter'.​[2]​ The notion of a 'materialism without matter' is silently borrowed by Balibar from a famous letter of Jacobi to Fichte, whose philosophy of the act and subjectivity Balibar does identify as a crucial precursor for the primacy of praxis. In order to shore up his own anti-dialectical and non-philosophical defense of faith against the claims of an omnivorous reason, Jacobi interestingly rehearsed a theme that many a critic of materialism as a philosophy (or an ontology) has since advanced, namely that it is but a specular inversion of idealism.​[3]​ 
	In Balibar's own estimation, Marx's displacement of the materialism/idealism distinction, which involved mining the resources of idealist philosophy to structure a materialist critique and catalyse a materialist politics, itself involved a related inversion, or dialectical chiasmus: in this view, traditional materialism was haunted by an idealist foundation – in its representation and contemplation of matter – while modern idealism could serve the gestation of a modern materialism because of its stress on the activity of the subject. What Marx proposed then 'is quite simply to explode the contradiction, to dissociate representation and subjectivity and allow the category of practical activity to emerge in its own right'.​[4]​ A fixed image of a system of material causality, impervious to human action – which would turn out to be a mere illusion or epiphenomenon – can thus be regarded as idealist, in the sense that it purports to an exhaustive and incontrovertible representation of the world. Contrariwise, the primacy of action – a thesis drawn from German Idealism at its most Promethean, even hubristic – could be the starting point for a materialism that grounds our representations, including of matter itself, in collective life, social relations and human practices. But what happens to a materialism without matter when social practice appears in all its antagonism, opacity, unconsciousness, as determined by forms and forces which are not transparent or even available to the activity of individuals or collectives? What happens when materialism turns out not to reduce ideal fantasies to bodies and objects, but to demonstrate the specific ways in which the latter are dominated by abstractions, in which capitalism conjures up, in Chris Arthur's formulation, 'a world of pure form' in which 'value emerges from the void as a spectre that haunts the 'real world' of capitalist commodity production'?​[5]​ What I want to suggest here, is that the materialism of practice of the early Marx, as captured in Balibar’s détournement of Jacobi’s formulation, must be drawn away from the humanist myth of a transparency of praxis, in the direction of a materialism attentive to the potent immateriality of capital’s social forms, a materialism of real abstractions.​[6]​
	It is not so difficult to see how ‘matter’, ‘materiality’ and ‘materialism’, in their claim to immediacy, firstness, and incontrovertible facticity could be deeply ideological names. The literary theorist Marc Shell begins his erudite exploration of The Economy of Literature with this astute observation: 

Those discourses are ideological that argue or assume that matter is ontologically prior to thought. Astrology, for example, looks to the stars, phrenology to the skull, physiognomy to the face, and palmistry to the hand. In the modern world, ideological discourses look to the biochemistry of the brain, sexual need, genes, and social class; they seek to express how matter ‘gives rise to’ thought by employing metaphors such as ‘influence’, ‘structure’, ‘imitation’, ‘sublimation’, ‘expression’, and ‘symptom’. Every ideology would demonstrate that all other ideologies are idealist expressions of the basic matter to which it alone has real access.​[7]​
 
	The critique of materialism as an ideology is at the core of Gramsci's lengthy critical annotations in the Prison Notebooks on Bukharin's attempt to popularise historical materialism. For Gramsci the grafting of a Marxist 'sociology' onto a materialism of matter, derived from an uncritical picture of the natural sciences, misses the core Marxian teaching, to wit that for a critique of political economy matter is always, as he writes, 'historically and socially organised for production'.​[8]​ Where for Marx natural forces are to be thought of as social, not abstractly ahistorical, Bukharin distorts the ‘philosophy of praxis’, turning it into the ‘“sociology” of metaphysical materialism’, a kind of political and social-scientific supplement to a naturalist materialism.​[9]​ In Bukharin, we can observe how a supposedly desecrating ultra-materalism flips into an abstract idealism when it tries directly to apply concepts extracted from the scientific domain, for instance atomic physics, to refute the claims of bourgeois ideology, say the robinsonnades of individualism. 
	It was around the same time that Karl Korsch, whose Karl Marx is quoted in manuscript form by Benjamin in The Arcades Project, was recalling Marx's disparaging comments about 'the philosophical phrases of the Materialists about matter'.​[10]​ For Korsch too, who likely also had Bukharin in his sights, it was the passage from the determinate abstractions of historical materialism as a theory of capitalism to a 'universal sociological theory' which posed the problem. A materialism that is not reflexive about its political, polemical and pedagogical function, as well as about its social rather than metaphysical character, can only repeat the idealist gesture that hypostasizes, divinizes and abstracts an unmediated ground. Here matter, there Spirit – which has the obvious advantage for Gramsci as for Marx of at least foregrounding practice and relationality. Aside from hammering home the danger for historical materialism of ignoring its crucial difference from metaphysical materialism, and thereby becoming an inverted idealism, an ahistorical ontology overlooking or underlying the process of history, Gramsci also includes in his critique of Bukharin a number of interesting historical notations about the manner in which the primacy of matter can take different political complexions, progressive in one conjuncture, regressive in another. Thus a materialist realism, advocating the rights of the empirical world against the fancies of the subject, is part of a certain reactionary Catholic philosophy, just as it can also make up the conservative common sense of certain popular classes. 
	A not entirely dissimilar intuition, roughly contemporary with Gramsci, lies behind the programmatic pronouncement by Adorno, in his study of Husserl, that the target of relentless dialectical critique should be the very idea of a first philosophy, a prima philosophia, whose 'original sin' is to eliminate everything which exceeds its judgment 'in order to enforce continuity and completeness' – where ‘firstness’ is also defining of an idea of philosophy as closed system.​[11]​ The elementary Hegelian lesson according to which every first is an abstraction, a simulacrum of immediacy, which can only appear as such through the dissimulation of the complex mediations that make its appearance possible, is one that for critical theory should apply with equal rigour to the claim of materialism; the problem, as Adorno notes about phenomenology, is not to replace the foundation with a firmer one, but to question the 'philosophical compulsion' of seeking final grounds.​[12]​ But what is a dialectical materialism or 'last philosophy' if, as Adorno writes: 'Nothing immediate or factical, in which the philosophical thought seeks to escape mediation through itself, is allotted to thinking reflection in any other way than through thoughts'?​[13]​ In other words, can the polemical gesture of demarcation, which in the case of materialism, is crucially linked to some form of 'reduction', survive the passage from first to last philosophy, the abandonment of the basic structure of metaphysics? 
	I want to propose that if we follow the thread of a materialism without matter, from the initial position of the problem in terms of subjective practice to the understanding of social forms and relations in terms of the power of 'real abstractions', that is to the critique of political economy understood as a critique of the ideologies of materiality, it is possible to maintain the imperative of reduction (or perhaps more precisely of correlation and displacement); yet this reduction will turn out to be a reduction of form to form, of cognitive or ideal abstractions to real or practical ones. I will turn to the works of Isaak Illich Rubin (1886-1937) and Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1899-1990) to sketch out what it might mean to extract from Marx's critique of political economy such a materialism of social forms. In a second moment, I will consider the way in which such a materialism throws up an 'aesthetic' question: how is one to represent, or indicate, the social powers of intangible forms, of real abstractions? I will home in on one of Louis Althusser's most unique and brilliant essays, 'Cremonini, Painter of the Abstract' – following Warren Montag’s powerful if unorthodox suggestion that the encounter with Cremonini is crucial to Althusser's articulation of materialist theory.​[14]​ 

II. Social forms and the critique of philosophy
In the Grundrisse, Marx defines capitalism as a social system in which human beings are ruled by abstractions, first and foremost.​[15]​ The overcoming of a merely philosophical – which is also to say ethical, moral and ideal – criticism of contemporary capitalist society requires refitting or refunctioning many of the conceptual and methodological tools of philosophy, in order to delineate and undermine the domination of social life by abstractions, and above all by the form of value. Without entertaining the melancholy conviction, voiced by Theodor Adorno, that philosophy perseveres in a guilty form because the hour of its realisation was forever missed, we can perhaps ask how things stand today for a discipline concerned above all with abstractions at various degrees of purity with regard to Marx’s challenge. As socio-economic demystifications of philosophical practice fall out of favour, we can identify three broad tendencies in the current articulation of philosophy, capitalism and abstraction. 
	The first, of a militant type, enlists the resources of ontological and metaphysical abstraction to erect a rational infrastructure for a broadly voluntarist anti-capitalist politics (the eminent example here is Alain Badiou). The second, rife in social theory, incorporates the legacies of post-modernism and post-structuralism in seeking to replace cold, Cartesian abstractions, with ‘warm’ abstractions. Materiality, bodies, diagrams, scapes, networks, assemblages are its catchwords.​[16]​ Generally, its invocations of materialism betray a remarkably dematerialised thinking, while its abstractions seem parasitic on a palette of experiences easily referred to the contemporary predicaments of intellectual labour. A third approach, which some have dubbed speculative realism or materialism, and is associated with a disparate host of philosophers – among them Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux​[17]​ – seeking to move away from ‘Continental’ phenomenology and hermeneutics, has tried to combine polemics against idealism and critical philosophy with a call for an unabashed return to the speculative, or the absolute, after the hesitations of deconstruction and the interdisciplinary hybrids spawned by much post-68 thought. About this recent tendency, we could perhaps unkindly repeat the quip by Alfred Sohn-Rethel, at the end of his Intellectual and Manual Labour, according to which the materialist who embarks on speculative philosophy is a bit like the man who throws himself into a fire in order to put it out. 
	In all three cases – in this admittedly ad hoc taxonomy – the question of the relationship between social being and forms of thought, or between capitalism and cognition, remains obscure. Either it is ignored, for the sake of a robust renewal of philosophy or a purely political use of abstractions, or it is sublimated, as social theory is transformed into the acritical description of a network of relations seemingly awash in myriad forms of abstraction, ones ultimately indistinguishable from concreteness – in a position that could be termed, harkening back to the post-Kantian philosopher Friedrich Albert Lange, a ‘materio-idealism’.​[18]​
	I want to argue that in this intellectual context returning to the Marxian discussion of ‘real abstraction’, and in particular to the writings of Alfred Sohn-Rethel – in primis his Intellectual and Manual Labour – can allow us to renew the neglected question of philosophy’s place in the understanding and critique of capitalism as a system of abstract domination.​[19]​ 
	The perspective I would like to adopt instead, taking inspiration from Sohn-Rethel’s pioneering reflections on ‘real abstraction’ – that is, on the origin of philosophical thought and modern subjectivity in the non-mental practice of commodity exchange and the mediations of the money form – is that it is the extra-mental logic of commodity exchange which underlies ‘Western change’, and that consequently, to put it in hyperbolic, but I think pertinent terms, while the essence of capitalism is not metaphysical, the essence of metaphysics is capitalist. Whereas earlier iterations of materialism countered metaphysics, and its attendant ideologies, by revealing it to be a spectre of matter, or of practice, a materialism of social forms that takes its cue from the notion of real abstraction tries to take seriously the thesis that our social life does not merely appear but is ‘metaphysical’.
	Against any Eurocentric pieties about the singularity of philosophy’s Greek origin, such a position demands that we begin with a radically profane expatriation: it is the contingent emergence of entirely mundane forms of social abstraction, pivoting around monetary exchange, which permitted the particular type of idealities characteristic of ancient Greek philosophy to emerge, not any mysterious spiritual features of that civilisation. Money is abstraction made tangible and visible, the representative, equivalent and medium of a fundamentally impersonal exchange, a relationship without qualities. Ideal abstraction (philosophy) is derivative, but also in a way identical to, the real abstraction of exchange.
	According to Sohn-Rethel, the ‘act of exchange has to be described as abstract movement through abstract (homogeneous, continuous, and empty) space and time of abstract substances (materially real but bare of sense-qualities) which thereby suffer no material change and which allow for none but quantitative differentiation (differentiation in abstract, non-dimensional quantity)’.​[20]​ The same underlying schema accounts for the productive heuristic fiction of homogeneous spatio-temporal individuation, and for the fact that ‘in the market-place and in shop windows, things stand still’, immersed as they are in the separation of the practices of use and the acts of exchange in time and space.​[21]​
	It is this spatio-temporal distinction between use and exchange that makes it possible to locate a 'material' and historical basis for formal and ahistorical modes of thinking and practice. In a classical meaning of the verb 'to abstract', the exchange abstraction subtracts from, is indifferent to, or suspends, the 'materiality' of the commodity – and it does so not through a cognitive act but through unconscious social practice. In Sohn-Rethel's elucidation: 'The form of exchangeability applies to commodities regardless of their material description. The abstraction comes about by force of the action of exchange or, in other words, out of the exchanging agents practicising their solipsism against each other. The abstraction belongs to the interrelationship of the exchanging agents and not to the agents themselves. For it is not individuals who cause the social synthesis but their actions. And their actions do it in such a way that, at the moment it happens, the actors know nothing of it'.​[22]​ 
The 'moment' of exchange is a most unusual moment. ‘The exchange-abstraction', Sohn-Rethel notes, 'is the historical, spatio-temporal origin of atemporal, ahistorical thought’.​[23]​ The nature of exchange is such that the ‘abstract’ activity of equivalence and commensuration is concrete, while use-value becomes a matter of ideal representation, and thus turns out to be abstract. This separation has to do with the purely social postulate that things can indeed be instantaneously frozen, a logical requirement for the exchange of commodities which is 'then' projected onto the natural world. The ‘mental’ reflection of commodity-exchange takes place through money as an abstract thing. Coined money is the value-form made visible, and the token of a socially unconscious practice: ‘Abstraction is therefore the effect of the action of men, and not of their thought. In reality, it takes place “behind their backs”, at the blind spot, so to speak, of human consciousness, that is there where the thinking and efforts of men are absorbed by their acts of exchange’.​[24]​ Unlike binding and embedded forms of pre-capitalist sociality, money as a social nexus is ‘formally unlimited’.​[25]​ This is a formal and logical echo of Marx's reflections about how money poses itself as the antithesis of any community, other than itself. Money is not just formally unlimited but tendentially exclusive of other standard of commensuration or mediums of intercourse.
	In the second notebook of the Grundrisse, from November 1857, Marx noted the way in which money 

directly and simultaneously becomes the real community [Gemeinwesen], since it is the general substance of survival for all, and at the same time the social product of all. But as we have seen, in money the community [Gemeinwesen] is at the same time a mere abstraction, a mere external, accidental thing for the individual, and at the same time merely a means for his satisfaction as an isolated individual. The community of antiquity presupposes a quite different relation to, and on the part of, the individual. The development of money … therefore smashes this community.​[26]​ 

Or, as the mention of 'mere' abstraction suggests (which we could juxtapose to the real abstraction of money), it recodes the pre-monetised community as an auxiliary resource for the real community of money, deployed or retracted in keeping with the shifting imperatives of accumulation.  
	But money is not just real community, it is also a sensus communis.​[27]​ Monetised exchange structures a socially transcendental aesthetic, which is not solely a matter of commensurability (and of its dialectical reliance on singularity, or the appearance of uniqueness​[28]​), but also that of a practical arrest of time and evacuation of space, which customary tools of psychology, or indeed of philosophy itself, are ill-prepared to analyse. This monetised abstraction is an activity that is simultaneously relational and impersonal, rather than in any sense primarily mental. It also for Sohn-Rethel differentiates between socialised men and animals. In a vignette from Intellectual and Manual Labour, he writes: 

Money is an abstract thing, a paradox in itself – a thing that performs its socially synthetic function without any human understanding. And yet no animal can ever grasp the meaning of money; it is accessible only to man. Take your dog with you to the butcher and watch how much he understands of the goings on when you purchase your meal. It is a great deal and even includes a keen sense of property which will make him snap at stranger’s hand daring to come near the meat his master has obtained and which he will be allowed to carry home in his mouth. But when you have to tell him ‘Wait, doggy, I haven’t paid yet!’ his understanding is at an end. The pieces of metal or paper which he watches you hand over, and which carry your scent, he knows, of course; he has seen them before. But their function as money lies outside the animal range’.​[29]​

	The crucial thing to grasp is that Sohn-Rethel’s derivation does not move from the density of empirically observable and palpably material social relations, to the supposedly distorting and transcendent illusions of philosophy; it takes its cue from Marx’s conception of value as a social form to ground ideal abstractions in real abstraction. In this account philosophy can thus be seen to develop from the ‘socialised mind of man’. As Sohn-Rethel declares, in one of the most peremptory and provocative of his formulations, philosophy ‘is money without its material attachments, immaterial and no longer recognisable as money and, indeed, no longer being money but the “pure intellect”’.​[30]​ 
	The aim here is that of ‘putting Kant back on his feet’, by analogy with Marx’s notorious statement on Hegel; to show how the synthetic powers of the transcendental subject are really social powers. Or, as Adorno argued in Negative Dialectics – partially acknowledging the considerable impact of Sohn-Rethel's thesis on the development of his own thought ever since their first contact in the late 1920s – the transcendental subject is society unconscious of itself.​[31]​ The elimination of society from abstract philosophical thought is a product of society itself; it is an abstraction that society makes from itself, in the exercise of intellectual labour and in the primacy of exchange as form of mediation. Capitalism is an abstract society, where the social nexus is not generated primarily by custom, reciprocity, or tradition – though these remain the material and forms of appearance of capitalist society – but in the indifference of exchange. The profound theoretical originality of Marx is thus to be sought in the fact that he provides ‘the first explanation of the historical origin of a pure phenomenon of form’.​[32]​ 
	Around the time of Sohn-Rethel's first theoretical epiphany this was also an important component of Isaak Illich Rubin's pioneering discussion of 'social form' in his Essays on Marx's Theory of Value (1928). From this last flowering of critical Marxism in the USSR, I only want to retain, for the purposes of this discussion, Rubin's stress on the fact that Marx's critique of classical political economy hinges on distinguishing between 'material categories' concerned with 'technical methods and instruments of labour', on the one hand, and 'social forms' concerned with specifically capitalist relations on the other. The blindspot of political economy is precisely its inability, evidenced by the theory of commodity fetishism, of thinking of why these particular value-forms are generated in bourgeois society, and wrongly supposing that it is in transhistorical 'material categories' – labour in general rather than labour-power, exchange separate from capital, and so on – that one can look for the clues to the structure and development of a mode of production. Contrariwise, it is 'the social function which is realized through a thing [that] gives this thing a particular social character, a determined social form, a “determination of form” (Formbestimmtheit), as Marx frequently wrote'.​[33]​  
	Marx's remonstrations against those political economists who, in Rubin's terms, cannot see the 'social forms' lying 'beneath' the 'technical functions in the process of material production' are legion. Historical materialism is predicated on the rejection of the spontaneous materialism of the political economists. This is the impetus behind such seemingly anti-materialist declarations as this famous passage from Volume 1 of Capital: 

The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition. Turn and examine a single commodity, by itself, as we will, yet in so far as it remains an object of value, it seems impossible to grasp it. If, however, we bear in mind that the value of commodities has a purely social reality, and that they acquire this reality only in so far as they are expressions or embodiments of one identical social substance, viz., human labour, it follows as a matter of course, that value can only manifest itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity.​[34]​ 

Earlier in the Grundrisse, Marx had criticised political economists for simply beginning with labour and seeking to build the forms of value out of it in a linear manner. His argument there was unimpeachably Hegelian, suggesting that the positing of the labour process as a point of departure was marred by its 'abstractness, its pure materiality'.​[35]​ This is an abstractness and materiality that of course becomes 'concrete' with the apotheosis of abstract labour, when, to quote again from the Grundrisse, 'particular skill becomes something more and more abstract and irrelevant, and as it becomes more and more a purely abstract activity, a purely mechanical activity, hence indifferent to its particular form; a merely formal activity, or, what is the same, a merely material [stofflich] activity, activity pure and simple, regardless of its form'.​[36]​ The critique of 'materialism' is also a key methodological postulate in Volume 2, for instance in Marx's sardonic attempts on those who think that fixed capital, for instance, should be 'fixed' in a common-sensically material sense of the term. This is how political economists go astray: 

Firstly, certain properties that characterize the means of labour materially are made into direct properties of fixed capital, e.g. physical immobility, such as that of a house. But it is always easy to show that other means of labour, which are also as such fixed capital, ships for example, have the opposite property, i.e. physical mobility.  Alternatively, the formal economic characteristic that arises from the circulation of value is confused with a concrete [dinglich] property ; as if things, which are never capital at all in themselves, could already in  themselves and by nature be capital in a definite form, fixed or circulat​ing.​[37]​

III. A Materialism of Absences
Discussions of the correlation or homonymy between the social forms of capital and the aesthetic forms of art are rife with fallacies, above all the one between the increased abstraction of art and the increased abstraction of capital. It is all the more interesting that one of Althusser's most fertile  inquiries into the problem of representing capital emerges from his attempt to articulate and defend the figurative practice of the Italian painter Leonardo Cremonini, against both the primacy of literally abstract painting and social-realist denunciations of its expressionist or existentialist character. It is in the displacements of the aesthetic and methodological vocabularies of form, visibility and abstraction that the originality of Althusser's intervention lies. In an earlier text, Althusser had signalled the specificity of art as that of making visible, through a process of allusion, 'retreat' and 'internal distantiation', the ideology in which these works bathe.​[38]​ Making visible, but not making known. 
	The stakes of the Cremonini are considerably higher, as his work becomes not just a sectoral materialism but, I would argue, a kind of allegory of the materialist method as such. For Cremonini's painting tackles, in the artistic register, the problem  of a materialism without matter. In Althusser's evocative words: 'Cremonini “paints” the relations which bind the objects, places and times. Cremonini is a painter of abstraction. Not an abstract painter, “painting” an absent, pure possibility, but a painter of the real abstract, “painting” in a sense we have to define, real relations (as relations they are necessarily abstract) between “men” and their “things”, or rather, to give the term its stronger sense, between “things” and their “men”'.​[39]​ This painting of relations is further entangled in a kind of non-specular reflection as the painting is also the painting of the relations between the painter and ‘his’ work. 
	A number of initial commentaries are in order: figuration, as a modality of representation, is here a conditio sine qua non, for 'alluding' to or 'indicating', relations which are intangible – one will encounter a curiously contiguous iteration of this argument in Deleuze's book on Francis Bacon, where instead of the structures of capital and ideology, it will be vital forces and intensities which figuration allows one to crystallise. For Deleuze: 

The task of painting is defined as the attempt to render visible forces that are not themselves visible. Likewise, music attempts to render sonorous forces that are not themselves sonorous. That much is clear. Force is closely related to sensation: for a sensation to exist, a force must be exerted on a body, on a point of the wave. But if force is the condition of sensation, it is nonetheless not the force that is sensed, since the sensation ‘gives’ something completely different from the forces that condition it. How will sensation be able to sufficiently turn in on itself, relax or contract itself, so as to capture these nongiven forces in what it gives us, to make us sense these insensible forces, and raise itself to its own conditions?​[40]​

	Cremonini's problem is, in his own register (but this register is not easily cordoned off from that of science, contraryto  to what Althusser’s earlier letter on art seemed to suggest), analogous the problem of a Marxist theory of capital as a theory of real abstractions, including the issue of how one is to confront the anti-humanist reversal which takes place in the 'inter-objectivity' of fetishism as things not only appear to but really do determine ‘their men’. Yet far from arranging this aesthetic of abstraction in terms of a dialectic of the abstract and the concrete, Cremonini appears to unfold his plastic project in terms of an ascension, a chain of being, moving from the mineral, to the vegetable, to the animal (and the human). 
	What Althusser identifies in this 'progression' is something like a disjunctive synthesis of materialisms: a materialism of matter which begins in the inorganic is limned or shadowed by a materialism of the immaterial, of the invisible. This duality is tangible in Althusser's own prose, which here draws on delectable poetic resources to describe materiality only in order to reduce it to an effect through which we can read the traces of an absent presence. From the geological to the vegetal to the animal we move, at the figural level, across 'the armatures and articulations, consolidated by weight and by history, of the passive body of an island, dormant in the heavy oblivion of the rocks, at the edge of an empty sea, a matter-less horizon' to 'the sharp growth of a bulb, the long shriek of the dumb stems' and at last, as dehumanised men commingle with dissected beasts to 'dismembered animals scattered among men collecting bony carcases, men like the carcases they bear on their emaciated shoulders'.​[41]​ Yet the focus is elsewhere, off-screen, off-canvas – the rocks’ 'difference', which makes them the 'ground' of men; the absences in the presences of the flowers, the invisible 'time of their growth'. And throughout the ponderous materiality – rocks like stems like bones like people – is really the sight for a kind of 'materialist' similarity whose urge is rather 'abstract': to distance men from our ideology of men, and to do so by distancing us, in the arrangement of this 'natural' ascension and progression, from our very idea of progress; to paint 'difference from this ideological project of the descent of forms'.​[42]​  
	That is, in order to move us towards a showing of real abstraction, through a displacement of our ideological vision, Cremonini also needs to transit through a kind of extreme materialism, the anti-humanist identification of men with their things: men 'fashioned from the material of their objects, circumscribed by it, caught and defined once and for all: faces corroded by the air, gnawed and seemingly amputated (almost too much faces), gestures and cries congealed into immutable weight, a parody of human time reduced to eternity, the eternity of matter'.​[43]​ This phase, crushing the humanism of natural progress under the impress of matter, is followed for Althusser – reviewing Cremonini's exhibition at the Venice Biennale – by the introduction of a painting of the relations among men, relations which appear in the metaphor of displacement, deformation, or that favourite Althusserian term, décalage. 
	Althusser excels here in an exploration of the role of the mirror in Cremonini's work, which far from any 'reflection theory' is caught up in a complex play of delays, misrecognitions, over-identifications, a play shaped by a definite space: the interiors in which Cremonini arranges the gravity of lives through tall vertical lines and makes visible the laws of their relation in the arrangement of circles.​[44]​ These spaces of displaced reflection, in which individuals are fixed to objects that mirror them and the sites that they inhabit, have left behind the line of descent of the antecedent series, but for Althusser Cremonini is getting at something more, and something other, than the bad, infinite relay between men and their things; he is straining towards a 'determinate absence'. And it is here, in an act not of reflection but perhaps of forced projection, that the Italian painter’s aesthetic problem becomes nigh-on indistinguishable from the aesthetic problem of a Marxist theoretical practice that moves from a materialism of matter to a materialism without matter. In Althusser's words:

In their 'finite' world which dominates them, Cremonini thus 'paints' (i.e. 'depicts' by the play of the similarities inscribed in the differences) the history of men as a history marked, as early as the first childhood games, and even in the anonymity of faces (of children, women and men), by the abstraction of their sites, spaces, objects, i.e. 'in the last instance' by the real abstraction which determines and sums up these first abstractions: the relations which constitute their living conditions. I do not mean – it would be meaningless – that it is possible to 'paint' 'living conditions', to paint social relations or the forms of the class struggle in a given society. But it possible, through visible connexions that depict by their disposition, the determinate absence which governs them. The structure which controls the concrete existence of men, i.e. which informs the lived ideology of the relations between men and objects and between objects and men, this structure, as a structure, can never be depicted by its presence, in person, but only by traces and effects, negatively, by indices of absence, in intaglio (en creux).​[45]​

	Among such effects are the deformations (and not the deformity) of the faces in Cremonini's paintings, which is a determinate absence of form for Althusser, as well as an erasure of the features of humanist ideology. But curiously, the absence which at one level appears as the determinate absence of structural causality, the 'positive, determinate absence which determines' these 'men', 'which makes them the anonymous beings that they are, the structural effects of the real relations which govern them' is at another, in a strange aesthetic reversal, the absence of ideology itself, what Althusser calls 'a purely negative absence, that of the humanist which is refused'​[46]​ these faces which cannot be seen, which do not take the form of individuality or subjectivity – whence Althusser's provocative remark that all of 'man' is present in Althusser in the guise of a double absence, the positive absence of capital and the negative absence of the human. 
	As far as the positive absence of capital is concerned, it is striking how Cremonini's problem both foreshadows and displaces – by adding the complexity of his dispositions of matter, forms and figures – Althusser's formulation, itself anticipated by the play of the visible and the invisible in Reading Capital, of the visibility of capital as a real abstraction. In his preface to the first volume of Capital, notorious for its suggestion that the reader bypass the core of Marx's theory of abstraction, Althusser writes of how the 'apprenticeship' to thinking with abstractions is rendered particularly daunting by the fact that none of its grounding concepts – total social capital, surplus-value and so on – are ones that one can 'touch with one's hands' or 'see with one's eyes'. As he declares:

Every abstract concept therefore provides knowledge of a reality whose existence it reveals: an 'abstract concept' then means a formula which is apparently abstract but really terribly concrete, because of the object it designates. This object is terribly concrete in that it is infinitely more concrete, more effective than the objects one can 'touch with one's hands' or 'see with one's eyes' – and yet one cannot touch it with one's hands or see it with one's eyes. … Simply speaking: in order to be able to analyse these concrete capitalist societies (England, France, Russia, etc.), it is essential to know that they are dominated by that terribly concrete reality, the capitalist mode of production, which is 'invisible' (to the naked eye). 'Invisible', i.e. abstract.​[47]​

	This, it seems to me, is the aesthetic and experiential – which is also to say representational and figural – problem at the heart of a materialism without matter, or, to shift the formulation somewhat, a realism of the abstract. It is a problem which, as I have tried to argue with regard to the aesthetic parameters of actor-network theory,​[48]​ can't even be posed in contemporary invocations of materiality that repudiate the ideas of social form and totality and stubbornly demand that all representations be if not reducible at least traceable to a transaction between the nodes of a network. Yet it is also a problem that remains daunting in its perilous under-determination: how are we to tell apart the negative from the positive absences, ideology from the structure of capital? How are we to posit that which the effects of this absence presuppose? It is here that a materialism without matter calls on a finer science of invisibilities – a metaphysics indeed, but one which is indexed to real abstractions and not merely cognitive protocols. Making the invisible visible and making the invisible known are not necessarily coterminous activities (science, for Althusser, is not an aesthetic). But the character of that invisibility varies – are we speaking of a form, a force, a structure? And couldn't we say that the problem of representing capital is much better framed as a problem about the representation of a metamorphosis, the sequence and syncopation of value forms, than it is in terms of an absent structure?​[49]​ 
	But perhaps the thorniest problems that such a materialism without matter raises, which leads us back from abstraction towards praxis, is who is this visibility for? The preface to Capital is addressed at least in part to a proletarian audience, which it presumes to be better prepared to the apprenticeship in abstraction to the extent that it has felt the impact of these 'invisible' realities on its labouring, suffering bodies. Anticipating the autobiographical confession that theoretical anti-humanism was but a prelude to practical humanism, the essay on Cremonini stresses that the play of displacements, skewed reflections and determinate absences in the Italian's paintings is there to mark the distance between knowledge (which is a knowledge through the gaps in the false) and recognition (another 'aesthetic' thematic). Inserted into ideology in order to mark a distance from it, Cremonini's painting stands comparison with the great works of revolutionary anti-humanism (or, we could suggest, it allegorises them) to the extent that it embodies the conviction that 

the freedom of men is not achieved by the complacency of its ideological recognition, but by knowledge of the laws of their slavery, and that the “realization” of their concrete individuality is achieved by the analysis and mastery of the abstract relations which govern them. … This painter of the abstract, like the great revolutionary philosophers and scientists, would not paint, and would not paint the ‘abstraction’ of their world, if he did not paint for concrete men, for the only existing men, for us.​[50]​ 

It is this us which forms a kind of third absence, after those of capital and man, an absence both practical and prophetic, that of a concreteness and collectivity to come. It over-determines a knowledge which here amounts to nothing but – but this nothing is all – showing the gaps or opening the distances within the order of abstract domination itself. 
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